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Abstract
In recent years, DeepFake is becoming a common threat to
our society, due to the remarkable progress of generative ad-
versarial networks (GAN) in image synthesis. Unfortunately,
existing studies that propose various approaches, in fighting
against DeepFake, to determine if the facial image is real or
fake, is still at an early stage. Obviously, the current Deep-
Fake detection method struggles to catch the rapid progress
of GANs, especially in the adversarial scenarios where at-
tackers can evade the detection intentionally, such as adding
perturbations to fool DNN-based detectors. While passive de-
tection simply tells whether the image is fake or real, Deep-
Fake provenance, on the other hand, provides clues for track-
ing the sources in DeepFake forensics. Thus, the tracked fake
images could be blocked immediately by administrators and
avoid further spread in social networks.
In this paper, we investigated the potentials of image tag-
ging in serving the DeepFake provenance. Specifically, we
devise a deep learning-based approach, named DeepTag, with
a simple yet effective encoder and decoder design to em-
bed message to the facial image, which is to recover the
embedded message after various drastic GAN-based Deep-
Fake transformation with high confidence. The embedded
message could be employed to represent the identity of fa-
cial images, which further contributed to DeepFake detec-
tion and provenance. Experimental results demonstrate that
our proposed approach could recover the embedded message
with an average accuracy of nearly 90%. Our research finding
confirms effective privacy-preserving techniques for protect-
ing personal photos from being DeepFaked. Thus, effective
proactive defense mechanisms should be developed for fight-
ing against DeepFakes, instead of simply devising DeepFake
detection methods that can be mostly ineffective in practice.
1 Introduction
Capturing the exciting moments with camera and sharing
them with friends over social networks (e.g., Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram) becomes a common activity in our daily
life. However, with the recent development of GAN and its
variants, our shared photos may suffer from being manipu-
lated by various GANs to create DeepFakes (Mirsky and Lee
2020). Abusing the DeepFakes can bring potential threats
and concerns to everyone, for example, releasing a realis-
tic fake statement, creating fake pornography, etc. Addition-
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Figure 1: Comparison between a vulnerable social media platform
(top panel) and a DeepTag protected social media platform (bottom
panel) in handling malicious bad actors for spreading the misinfor-
mation by using DeepFake technology.
ally, many freely available tools (e.g., FaceApp, ZAO) allow
users to easily create DeepFakes on their own without any
additional expertise. Thus, effective measures should be de-
veloped to fight against DeepFakes to protect our personal
security and privacy.
In fighting against DeepFakes, researchers are actively
proposing various techniques to determine if a suspicious
still image or video is real or fake passively. These studies
mostly focus on the artifacts introduced in synthesizing the
images with GANs. Identifying the synthesized images with
observable artifacts (Li, Chang, and Lyu 2018; Yang, Li, and
Lyu 2019) and detecting the synthesized images using deep
neural networks (DNN) to spot the invisible artifacts (Dang
et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020d) are the two mainstream ap-
proaches in detecting DeepFakes. Unfortunately, our investi-
gation into the artifact-based methods has revealed that they
still suffer a lot from the following two issues.
• Generalization. Almost all the existing studies are fo-
cused on evaluating the effectiveness of their method on a
limited number of known GANs. Since advanced GANs
will be developed at an enormous speed and the artifacts
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which could be employed in previous GANs for distin-
guishing real and fake will likely be removed (Karras et al.
2020; Choi et al. 2020).
• Robustness. Simple image transformation (e.g., resizing,
compression, Gaussian noises) and adversarial attack with
carefully crafted perturbations are two obstacles in de-
veloping robust detectors (Qian et al. 2020; Carlini and
Farid 2020). Especially, the adversarial attacks by adding
imperceptible noises can fool DNN-based detectors with
high confidence in many cases (Carlini and Farid 2020;
Huang et al. 2020b).
Undoubtedly, advanced GANs will be developed to pro-
duce high-quality synthesized images with fewer artifacts.
These advanced GANs will be applied for creating Deep-
Fakes maliciously and pose real challenges for detection
since existing detectors are not generalized to unknown
GANs. Furthermore, recent studies have demonstrated that
DNN-based detectors are susceptible to adversarial noise at-
tacks by adding imperceptible perturbations into the facial
images. To address these two issues in passively defending
DeepFakes, we propose a novel approach, named DeepTag,
by protecting the safety and privacy of faces with image tag-
ging to embed messages into the victim images and recover
them to determine whether they are DeepFaked and manip-
ulated by GANs proactively. Specifically, our proposed ap-
proach can be employed in DeepFake forensics for both de-
tection and provenance purposes.
Threat Model: In this paper, our threat model is described
in Fig. 1. A user could upload his/ her personal photos to so-
cial networks like Facebook and share it with friends or any-
one. Unfortunately, attackers can easily pick victim’s photos
and manipulate them with various GANs to create Deep-
Fakes they wanted, like releasing a fake statement in a video.
The created DeepFakes will cause panic and raise security
and privacy concerns for victims when it spreads on social
networks. Our proposed DeepTag embeds message into the
images before uploading to the social networks, after which
it tries to recover the embedded message from a suspicious
photo in social network for DeepFake detection and Deep-
Fake provenance by determining the sources based on the
recovered message. The key idea here is that our image tag-
ging method should be robust enough to survive the drastic
image transformation and reconstruction by the DeepFake
process. Finally, the confirmed DeepFakes could be blocked
and avoid further spreading.
Here are more details regarding Fig. 1. In the top panel,
after a user (Fig. 1-a1) uploads his/her personal photos to the
public domain social media platform, the personal picture
can be picked up by a malicious actor (Fig. 1-b1). The bad
actor can apply off-the-shelf DeepFake technology to pro-
duce a DeepFaked version of the user’s face image (Fig. 1-
c1). In this case, the male face is transformed to exhibit fe-
male’s attribute, which is one example of how DeepFake
can alter any face image without noticeable artifacts. Then,
the bad actor can upload the DeepFaked face image to the
same social media platform again (Fig. 1-d1), impersonat-
ing the user, or aiming at other malicious activities such as
spreading misinformation. As can be seen, the unprotected
social media platform is quite vulnerable in this scenario in
terms of identifying the DeepFake images and preventing
the spread of misinformation since no mechanism is estab-
lished to distinguish between a legitimate face image and a
DeepFake one.
On the contrary, in the bottom panel where the social me-
dia platform is protected by the proposed DeepTag mecha-
nism, the spread of misinformation can be effectively pro-
hibited. When a user uploads his/her personal photo (Fig. 1-
a2) to the social media platform, the DeepTag is invoked
to check whether this picture has been tagged by a Deep-
Tag message before (usually a UID that matches the user’s
identity). If this face image is new, DeepTag can embed a
message in the image, which is sufficiently robust to survive
drastic image transformation such as DeepFake reconstruc-
tion. When a malicious bad actor (Fig. 1-b2) picks out the
victim’s photo and applies the DeepFake technique (Fig. 1-
c2), the DeepTag message will survive. Then, when the bad
actor tries to upload the DeepFaked face image to the social
media platform again (Fig. 1-d2), the embedded DeepTag
message will trigger an alarm since the UID of the original
picture does not match the one of the bad actors, indicating
a perpetrating event has happened. In this way, proper mea-
sures can be taken to stop the spread of misinformation such
as blocking the uploading of the DeepFake face image, and/
or raising a red flag for this bad actor. In the bottom panel,
the DeepTag protected images are represented by a green tag
as well as a blue picture frame. In both panels, the pink ar-
rows depict the route that a bad actor can take from picking a
victim to the spread of misinformation. The blue arrow route
indicates where the DeepTag message remains active during
the whole process.
Our DeepTag is motivated by the existing studies on
the privacy-preserving of multimedia, for example, digi-
tal watermarking for digital multimedia copyright protec-
tion (Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas 2000). Digital watermark-
ing allows users to embed visible and invisible watermark-
ing into the target multimedia (e.g., text, image, audio). Our
proposed image tagging is similar to digital watermarking.
However, the difference between our image tagging and dig-
ital watermarking lies in that image tagging should survive
after various drastic image transformation with GAN, while
digital watermarking need to robust against common image
transformation. In tackling the GAN-based manipulation,
the following challenges need to be addressed in our image
tagging. 1) Diverse GANs. Existing GANs for face synthe-
sis could be classified as entire synthesis and partial synthe-
sis, but the manipulation intensity of them is obviously dif-
ferent. DeepTag needs to tackle diverse GANs with various
manipulation intensities. 2) Unclear manipulated region.
In creating DeepFakes using GAN, the manipulated regions
are unknown, thus the embedded message should avoid the
effects of position where manipulation is performed.
To address the aforementioned challenges in embedding a
message into the images, in this paper, our proposed Deep-
Tag is based on a simple yet effective encoder and decoder
architecture that could recover messages effectively even af-
ter drastic GAN-based transformation. The encoder and de-
coder are both DNNs and jointly trained. In DeepTag, a
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DeepFake simulator connects the encoder and decoder to
simulate various manipulation with GANs on the encoded
images to enforce that the decoder could recover the em-
bedded messages effectively after GAN-based transforma-
tion. To comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of our
DeepTag, our experiments are conducted on three state-of-
the-art (SOTA) GANs including STGAN (Liu et al. 2019),
StarGAN (Choi et al. 2018), and StyleGAN (Karras, Laine,
and Aila 2019). These three GANs involve all the two typ-
ical GAN-based transformations, entire synthesis and par-
tial synthesis. Experimental results have demonstrated that
DeepTag achieves an average accuracy of nearly 90% in re-
covering the embedded messages.
Our main contribution are summarized as follows:
• New idea in defending DeepFake with image tagging.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work propos-
ing image tagging to achieve DeepFake forensics for
both DeepFake detection and DeepFake provenance. Our
proactive defense techniques could overcome the gener-
alization and robustness issues in the traditional artifact-
based DeepFake detection.
• Performing a comprehensive evaluation of the effec-
tiveness on typical GANs. Experiments are conducted
on three SOTA GANs spanning entire synthesis and par-
tial synthesis. Experimental results demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness in embedding messages and recovering them
after drastic GAN-based transformation.
• New insight for defending DeepFakes. Detecting syn-
thesized images based on artifacts passively for Deep-
Fakes is not enough for defending DeepFakes since they
are not generic to unknown GANs and robust against ad-
versary attack. Our approach presents a new insight by
employing image tagging to protect the safety of images
proactively.
2 Related Work
2.1 DeepFake Creation and Detection
GANs (Goodfellow et al. 2014) have achieved remarkable
progress in image synthesis (Zhu et al. 2017) and voice syn-
thesis (Oord et al. 2016), which are widely employed in cre-
ating realistic DeepFakes. In this paper, we mainly focus on
image synthesis which plays a key role in creating modern
DeepFakes. Entire synthesis and partial synthesis are two
typical manipulations in facial image synthesis with GANs
(Tolosana et al. 2020). In the entire synthesis, the whole syn-
thesized images are totally generated by GANs and it can be
used for synthesizing a new face that does not exist in the
world. PGGAN (Karras et al. 2017) and StyleGAN (Kar-
ras, Laine, and Aila 2019) can generate high-resolution fa-
cial images to improve the quality of a given face. Specif-
ically, StyleGAN has the capability to synthesize a non-
existent face by utilizing the idea of style transfer. In the
partial synthesis, the face attributes like hair, expression, are
manipulated by GANs automatically. StarGAN (Choi et al.
2018), STGAN (Liu et al. 2019), and AttGAN (He et al.
2019) can edit the attributes in a fine-grained manner, for ex-
ample, changing the hair color, wearing eyeglasses, turning
the smiling expression into scared, etc. Thus, determining
whether a facial image is manipulated by GANs provides a
straightforward idea for detecting DeepFake.
Due to the imperfection design of existing GANs, the
manipulated images with GAN inevitably introduces vari-
ous artifacts. Existing studies on identifying DeepFakes are
mostly leveraging the artifacts as clues. The artifacts can be
classified as observable-artifacts noticed by human eyes and
invisible-artifacts learned by DNN-based classifiers (Wang
et al. 2020c; Zhang, Karaman, and Chang 2019).
Lyu et al. proposed to spot DeepFake video by observ-
ing the lack of eye blinking in the synthesized face (Li,
Chang, and Lyu 2018). The inconsistent head poses in the
synthesized face is another observable-artifacts in Deep-
Fake videos (Yang, Li, and Lyu 2019). Some researchers
also investigated the invisible-artifacts which could be used
for spotting DeepFakes. Wang et al. observed that CNN-
generated images contain common artifacts that could be
identified by careful pre- and post-processing and data aug-
mentation (Wang et al. 2020d). Frank et al. addressed the
GAN-generated image identification with a basic obser-
vation that the artifacts revealed in the frequency domain
(Frank et al. 2020). AutoGAN (Zhang, Karaman, and Chang
2019) observed the upsampling design in GAN will intro-
duce artifacts in the synthesized images, thus they developed
a GAN simulator to produce fake images and train a classi-
fier to detect GAN-generated images. These proposed meth-
ods all claimed the effectiveness on seen GANs, but their
capabilities on unknown GANs are still unclear.
2.2 Digital Watermarking
In the past decades, digital watermarking plays a key role in
digital multimedia copyright protection. Digital watermark-
ing indicates that the embedded watermark could be visible
and invisible by human eyes and the embedded watermark
in the carrier should be recovered even after various im-
age transformation. Thus, robustness is the main concerns in
designing an effective embedding algorithm (Katzenbeisser
and Petitcolas 2000; Podilchuk and Delp 2001; Siddaraju,
Jayadevappa, and Ezhilarasan 2015).
The spatial and frequency domain are two lines in em-
bedding watermark into the carrier. Spatial domain is more
easily to perform than the frequency domain, but it can be
easily corrupted or attacked by attackers with pixel pertur-
bations (Singh et al. 2012). The spatial domain techniques
embed watermark by modifying the pixels value, such as the
least significant bit (LSB) (Bamatraf, Ibrahim, and Salleh
2010). In embedding on the frequency domain, the carrier
will be first converted into a specific transformation, then
the watermark will be embedded in the transformation coef-
ficients. The common frequency domains adopted in embed-
ding watermarks include discrete cosine transform (DCT),
discrete wavelet transform (DWT), discrete Fourier trans-
form (DFT), and singular value decomposition (SVD) (Jian-
sheng, Sukang, and Xiaomei 2009; Khan et al. 2013; Yavuz
and Telatar 2007).
With the rapid development of deep learning, end-to-end
watermark embedding techniques are proposed in recent
years. HiDDeN (Zhu et al. 2018) proposed the first end-
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to-end framework by jointly training encoder and decoder
network which could robust to noises like Gaussian blur-
ring, pixel-wise dropout, etc. StegaStamp (Tancik, Milden-
hall, and Ng 2020) presented a steganographic algorithm
for embedding arbitrary hyperlink into the photos, which
comprises a deep neural network for encoding and decod-
ing. In addressing the unknown image distortion, Luo et al.
proposed a framework for distortion agnostic watermarking
(Luo et al. 2020) which are generic to unseen distortions.
3 Methodology
We present the very first facial image tagging approach for
DeepFake provenance. We give our motivation and summa-
rize the qualifications of a desirable image tagging solution
against DeepFake in Section 3.1. Then, we establish the im-
age tagging pipeline in Section 3.2.
3.1 Motivation
Existing techniques against DeepFake aim at observing the
artifacts in the synthesized images with various methods.
However, these studies suffer two issues, 1) they are not gen-
eral to unknown GANs (Karras et al. 2020), 2) they are eas-
ily susceptible to adversarial attacks by adding perturbations
intentionally or simple image transformation (e.g., compres-
sion, Gaussian noises) (Qian et al. 2020; Carlini and Farid
2020). Thus, the existing artifact-based techniques are not
prepared in tackling the future emerging DeepFake threats.
Another straightforward idea for protecting facial images
against DeepFake is that we can borrow the idea in privacy-
preserving to defend DeepFakes proactively. Thus, we ex-
plore whether a robust image tagging can be served as a
safeguard for protecting the safety of facial images in so-
cial networks against DeepFake. The image tagging allows
us to easily conduct DeepFake detection and provenance
with the embedded message. Our image tagging is similar
to digital watermarking which is widely applied in protect-
ing the copyright of digital multimedia (Ambadekar, Jain,
and Khanapuri 2019), but ours has the following challenges
which are vastly different to digital watermarking:
• Image tagging for DeepFake should be robust against
GAN-based transformation, rather than simple image
transformation like digital watermarking.
• The manipulated region in DeepFake is always unknown,
however, the corrupted region in copyright protection can
be figured out sometimes.
Inspired by the advances of deep learning in achieving
end-to-end watermarking, we employ a DNN based encoder
and decoder and jointly trained to enforce that the embedded
message could survive various drastic GAN-based transfor-
mation. In the subsections, we introduce the pipeline of our
proposed image tagging for DeepFake.
3.2 Image Tagging Pipeline
Overview Fig. 2 gives an overview of our proposed Deep-
Tag overall architecture. Our method includes three key
components, a DNN-based encoder Fenc, a GAN simulator
Figure 2: Training pipeline for DeepTag.
Gsim, and a DNN-based decoder Fdec. The encoder and de-
coder are inspired by a previous work StegaStamp (Tancik,
Mildenhall, and Ng 2020). Specifically, the functionalities
of each component as follows.
• The encoder Fenc embeds a message (usually a UID) into
a facial image and ensures the embedded message invis-
ible to human eyes. In other words, the encoded image
needs to be perceptually similar to the input image.
• The GAN simulator Gsim is adopted for performing var-
ious GAN-based transformation, including entire synthe-
sizing the encoded facial images, editing the attributes of
encoded facial images.
• The decoder Fdec recovers the embedded message from
the encoded facial images after drastic GAN-based trans-
formation. The recovered UID is further used for the iden-
tity verification purpose.
Image tagging encoder-decoder training The DNN-
based encoder and decoder are jointly trained to embed mes-
sages into the given input facial images. The encoder allows
an arbitrary message to imperceptibly embed into the given
arbitrary facial images. The decoder is trained to retrieve the
embedded message even after drastic GAN-based manipula-
tion. Here, the embedded message indicates n bits UID, but
it can be easily extended to arbitrary binary bits.
Specifically, the encoder Fenc receives a facial image i
and a message w as input, then the encoder output a tagged
facial image i˜ with a mapping Fenc(i,w) 7→ i˜. The input
facial image i need to perceptually similar to the encoded
facial image i˜, where i ≈ i˜. The encoded facial images
may manipulated by GAN, where Gsim(˜i) 7→ i. The de-
coder try to recover the embedded message Fdec(i) 7→ w˜ or
Fdec(˜i) 7→ w˜, where w˜ ≈ w.
To improve the capabilities of our decoder in recovering
the embedded message from the encoded images, we need
to explore where and when to embed message. In this paper,
we embed the message in less manipulated regions and the
late embedding level in the encoder. In manipulating faces
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Type Manipulation GAN
Entire synthesis full StyleGANidentity swap ZAO
Partial synthesis facial attributes (e.g., eyeglass, gender) StarGANfacial expression (e.g., smile, scared) STGAN
Table 1: GANs adopted in creating DeepFake. The column Type
indicates the fake type including entire synthesis and partial syn-
thesis. The column Manipulation means the facial region that will
be manipulated. The column GAN represents typical GANs. ZAO
is an app for face manipulation, but the technical details are still
unknown to us.
with GAN, the faces involve entire synthesis and partial syn-
thesis, thus we employ masks to enforce more messages em-
bedded in the region less manipulated by GANs. The level of
embedding indicates when we can embed the message in the
encoder. The late embedding in the encoder is less corrupted
than early embedding since more layers are processed.
GAN-based manipulation DeepFake involves facial im-
ages manipulation with various GANs. Specifically, existing
GANs can be classified into entire synthesis and partial syn-
thesis. The details refer to Tab. 1. Our encoded facial im-
ages will be corrupted by these GAN-based manipulations.
Thus, a GAN simulator performs the two typical manipula-
tions by connecting our encoder and decoder to enforce that
the decoder could learn how to recover message after drastic
GAN-based manipulations.
Losses To train the encoder and decoder jointly, we use a
series of losses in training. Particularly, we adopt the losses
defined in StegaStamp (Tancik, Mildenhall, and Ng 2020).
Here, we use L2 residual regularization LR, the LPIPS per-
ceptual loss (Zhang et al. 2018) LP , and a critic loss LC
calculated between encoded image and input image. We use
cross entropy loss LM for the message. The training loss is
calculated as follows.
L = λRLR + λPLP + λCLC + λMLM (1)
where λR,P,C should be set to zero initially while the de-
coder trains to high accuracy, after which λR,P,C are in-
creased linearly.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our proposed DeepTag in recovering the embed-
ded message after drastic GAN-based manipulation. Specifi-
cally, we evaluate the effectiveness of DeepTag against three
typical GANs including entire and partial synthesis and its
robustness against image perturbations. Furthermore, we ex-
plore the performance in tackling different length of embed-
ded messages and the impact on the level of embedding.
4.1 Experiment Setup
GANs In our experiments, we employ three GANs, i.e.,
StarGAN (Choi et al. 2020), STGAN (Liu et al. 2019),
and StyleGAN (Karras, Laine, and Aila 2019), since they
achieved the state-of-the-art performance in faces manipu-
lation. StyleGAN can reconstruct a given face and generate
a new face. Both StarGAN and STGAN involve partial syn-
thesis including facial attributes editing (e.g., wearing eye-
glasses, changing hair color) and expression manipulation
(e.g., smile, scared).
Dataset We employ CelebA-HQ (Karras et al. 2017) that
is a public face dataset consisting 30,000 facial images and
contains several different size facial images, such as 128 ×
128, 512×512, and 1, 024×1, 024, etc. In our experiments,
we explore the effectiveness of DeepTag in tackling facial
images with different input size.
Metrics To evaluate the performance of DeepTag quanti-
tatively, we employ accuracy to measure the recovered mes-
sage after GAN-based manipulations. The accuracy indi-
cates the full message retrieval rate (FMRR). Furthermore,
PSNR and SSIM are adopted for calculating the similarity
between the input and encoded facial images with DeepTag.
4.2 Implementation
Encoder Our encoder is trained to embed messages into
carrier images while preserving the perceptual similar to the
input carrier. Here, we use a U-Net (Ronneberger, Fischer,
and Brox 2015) style architecture for receiving the input car-
rier images and output an encoded three-channel image. In
our experiments, we explore different size of input carrier
images (e.g., 128× 128, 512× 512) and different length of
embedded message (e.g., 20 bits, 30 bits, 50 bits). Further-
more, the embedded message could be embedded in differ-
ent levels in our encoder for achieving better performance in
recovering the message in the decoder.
Decoder Our decoder is trained to retrieve the embedded
message from the encoded images that are the output of our
encoder. The decoder consists of seven convolutional layers
with kernel size 3× 3 and strides ≥ 1, one dense layer, and
finally output the decoded message with the sigmoid activa-
tion function. The size of the decoded message is the same
as the embedded message.
GAN simulator We employ three GANs that have
achieved state-of-the-art performance in their field, i.e., Star-
GAN, STGAN, and StyleGAN. The three GANs involve all
the two typical GAN manipulation (e.g., entire synthesis,
partial synthesis) in creating DeepFakes.
Encoder and decoder training The encoder and decoder
are jointly trained with randomly generated messages. The
input images are collected from the public dataset CelebA-
HQ. In training, we use 4 different sizes input facial images
to train the model to explore the performance of DeepTag in
tackling input faces of different sizes.
4.3 Effectiveness
In this section, we mainly explore the effectiveness of our
proposed DeepTag in recovering the embedded messages
with different GANs manipulation. Three GANs are adopted
in our experiments for evaluation, namely StyleGAN for en-
tire synthesis, STGAN and StarGAN for partial synthesis.
Here, the length of the message is set to 30 bits, and the late
embedding is implemented.
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Image Size
Facial Attributes
bald mustache eyeglasses plain skin
128× 128 0.912 0.923 0.891 0.872
256× 256 0.920 0.931 0.913 0.893
512× 512 0.928 0.941 0.918 0.902
Average 0.920 0.932 0.907 0.889
Table 2: Performance (FMRR) of DeepTag on STGAN. The facial
attributes mean the encoded images will be manipulated on such
attributes. Manipulating the color of skin is the most drastic one.
Image Size
Facial Attributes
blond hair gender angry happy
128× 128 0.901 0.761 0.831 0.842
256× 256 0.909 0.779 0.846 0.849
512× 512 0.913 0.803 0.852 0.853
Average 0.908 0.781 0.843 0.848
Table 3: Performance (FMRR) of DeepTag on StarGAN. The facial
attributes mean the encoded images will be manipulated on such
attributes. Changing the hair color to blond is the most moderate
one than the three other facial attributes.
Tab. 2 summarizes the performance of DeepTag in tack-
ling the attributes manipulation with STGAN. In the ex-
periments, the manipulated attributes include removing hair
into bald, adding mustache, wearing eyeglasses, and chang-
ing into pale skin. Experimental results have shown that our
DeepTag can perform well in the three former attributes ma-
nipulation, but susceptible to the skin color changing. The
main reason is that the manipulation region is larger and the
intensity is drastic than others. We also observe that the size
of the input image has a positive impact on performance.
Large size image can provide more space for embedding
message and can survive in GAN-based manipulation more
easily.
Tab. 3 presents the performance of DeepTag in dealing
with StarGAN. The manipulated attributes include turning
hair color to blond, changing gender, and facial expressions
(angry & happy). Among these four facial attributes manip-
ulation, the hair color changing is the most moderate one in-
volving less region manipulation. Experimental results show
that our DeepTag achieve an average accuracy of 90.8% on
the hair changing manipulation. However, DeepTag gives an
accuracy of 78.1% on the gender manipulation that involves
the whole skin modification. In tackling the facial expression
manipulation, DeepTag reaches an accuracy nearly 85% on
the two common facial expression manipulation. Compared
with the performance on STGAN and StarGAN, we can no-
tice that the performance of DeepTag on STGAN is better
than StarGAN due to the less artifact existed in STGAN.
StyleGAN indicates the entire synthesis which receives
an input image and reconstructs it with less observable ar-
tifacts. In our experiments, we evaluate the performance on
1024 × 1024 size image with a pretrained model provided
by StyleGAN1. Experimental results show that DeepTag
achieves an accuracy of more than 95.1% on the large res-
olution facial images. It is interesting to explore the perfor-
mance of low resolution with StyleGAN, but training Style-
1
https://github.com/Puzer/stylegan-encoder
GAN for entire synthesis is extremely time-consuming and
computing resource-intensive.
According to the experimental results of DeepTag on the
three GANs, we can easily find that the input image size
has a positive impact on the recovering message, while the
manipulated region has a negative impact on the embedded
message retrieval. Furthermore, advanced GANs with less
artifact in the synthesized images could also reduce the neg-
ative impact in message retrieval. Similarly, the advanced
GANs could also be employed for creating realistic Deep-
Fakes in the future.
4.4 Impacts on the message size
Capacity is an important factor for measuring the capability
of our DeepTag in embedding message. A large capacity in-
dicates that the carrier can contain more information which
could represent a large number of UID in our work. Thus,
we explore the impact of message size on the performance
of DeepTag in recovering messages.
Fig. 3 shows the relation between the accuracy of Deep-
Tag in recovering messages and the length of message on
three GANs. For STGAN and StarGAN, the input image
size is 256×256 which is the most common size in sharing
images on the social networks. We select the bald attribute
for STGAN and blond hair attribute for StarGAN. These two
attributes involve less manipulated regions, which could be
better for us to illustrate the problem.
Experimental results show that the length of message has
a negative impact on the performance of DeepTag in recov-
ering embedded message. DeepTag can achieve an accuracy
of more than 95% on the three GNAs when the size of em-
bedded message is 20 bits. However, the accuracy reduces to
less than 70% when the size of embedded message is 50 bits.
Actually, the 30 bits of message can represent more than 1
billion different UIDs and the 35 bits can represent more
than 34 billion UIDs. We believe that message with the 30
bits or 35 bits is enough for a social media platform to assign
each user a specified UID.
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Figure 3: Performance of DeepTag on different size of messages.
4.5 Impact on the level of embedding
In DeepTag, the message could be embedded in the differ-
ent levels of encoder, thus we explore the raw embedding,
early embedding and late embedding. The raw embedding
indicates the message embedded along with the carrier as
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Embedding
Facial Attributes
bald mustache eyeglasses plain skin
Raw 0.880 0.898 0.903 0.861
Early 0.891 0.911 0.901 0.869
Late 0.920 0.931 0.913 0.893
Table 4: Performance (FMRR) of DeepTag on three different level
embedding. STGAN is adopted for evaluation and the input image
size is 256× 256.
Metrics
GAN
STGAN StarGAN StyleGAN
PSNR ↑ 27.48 26.32 29.89
SSIM ↑ 0.901 0.862 0.927
Table 5: Image quality of the encoded images and input measured
by PSNR and SSIM. For PSNR and SSIM, the higher the better.
input to the encoder. The early and late embedding means
that the message embedded in the front and behind layer in
the encoder, more details refer to Fig. 2.
Tab. 4 presents the performance of DeepTag on three dif-
ferent level embedding. The input image size is 256 × 256
and the adopted GAN is STGAN for its performance in par-
tial synthesis. Experimental results show that the late em-
bedding outperforms both raw and early embedding. Fur-
thermore, the early embedding is better than raw embedding
in most of the time, except wearing eyeglasses manipulated
by STGAN. Experimental results in Tab. 4 indicates that the
embedded message would be easily corrupted when more
layers are processed in the encoder.
4.6 Quantitatively measuring encoded images
In DeepTag, the encoder outputs an encoded image with em-
bedded message. Ideally, the encoded images should be per-
ceptually similar to the input image. Here, we use two dif-
ferent metrics, PSNR and SSIM for measuring the distance
between encoded image and input. Experimental result in
Tab. 5 illustrates that our encoded image could maintain high
visual quality. Furthermore, the StyleGAN achieved the best
performance among the three GANs, due to that the entire
synthesis exhibits less artifact.
4.7 Robustness against perturbations
In creating DeepFake videos, the manipulated images will
be further processed by numerous image perturbations like
compression, resizing, etc. In this section, we evaluated the
robustness of DeepTag in tackling these image perturbations
which are common appeared in producing videos.
Fig. 4 presents the robustness evaluation results of Deep-
Tag on three GANs. In experiments, we employ two widely
appeared perturbations in creating DeepFake videos, namely
compression and resizing. For STGAN, we select the bald
facial attributes for manipulation. For StarGAN, we select
the blond hair attributes for manipulation. The StyleGAN in-
volves the entire synthesis. The input image size for STGAN
and StarGAN is 256 × 256, while the input image size for
StyleGAN is 1024× 1024.
Experimental results show that the accuracy in recovering
message decreased when the compression quality increased,
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Figure 4: Robustness evaluation with compression and resizing
degradations.
but our DeepTag could achieve more than 80% in even when
the compression quality is 80%. The higher compression
quality indicates more messages will be discarded. In tack-
ling the resizing perturbation, the performance of DeepTag
is similar to compression where the scale factor has posi-
tive impacts on the accuracy. The small scale factor means a
large resizing and it further results in a bad performance for
DeepTag in recovering. In the real scenario, we can see that
the compression quality for compression and the scale factor
for resizing will not be too bad that touches the boundary. To
some extent, our DeepTag can be well applied for real appli-
cation in considering the robustness against perturbations.
Our pioneering work leverages image tagging for defend-
ing DeepFakes proactively. In the performance evaluation,
we consider the most strict case where all the bits are fully
recovered. DeepTag will have an even broader application,
more robustness, and stronger resilience when partial errors
could be tolerated in the retrieval or applying the redundancy
code design techniques for embedding message.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed DeepTag that embeds messages
into the images for DeepFake provenance. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that presents a new in-
sight for fighting against DeepFake from the perspective of
privacy-preserving, which aims to defend DeepFake proac-
tively. Experiments on three typical GANs including the en-
tire synthesis and partial synthesis demonstrate the effective-
ness of our method in embedding watermarking into facial
images and recovering them from facial images after drastic
GAN-based transformation.
With the rapid development of AI-techniques, nobody can
imagine future advances in producing DeepFakes. We can
confirm that the DeepFake will become more and more re-
alistic and everyone could fall victim. In this AI era, we are
living in a world where we cannot believe our eyes anymore.
However, detecting DeepFakes by observing the artifacts in
the synthesized images is obviously insufficient for protect-
ing us against this AI risk. Our work poses a new insight for
fighting against DeepFakes proactively, instead of observing
the artifacts by leveraging domain knowledge in synthesized
images which could be easily invalid in unseen GANs. In fu-
ture work, the community needs to develop more powerful
defense strategies by considering how to protect images to
avoid DeepFake threats.
Another orthogonal research direction is to investigate
the interplay between DeepTag-based provenance technique
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and the state-of-the-art DeepFake detection methods (Qi
et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020b; Huang et al. 2020d) as well
as methods that can help DeepFakes more detection-evasive
(Huang et al. 2020c,a). The effectiveness of the DeepTag
under the presence of various adversarial perturbation, es-
pecially those that are not purely based on additive noise,
such as (Gao et al. 2020; Cheng et al. 2020b; Tian et al.
2020; Zhai et al. 2020; Guo et al. 2020b; Wang et al. 2020a;
Guo et al. 2020a; Cheng et al. 2020a) is also worth carefully
studying.
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